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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of differential employment restrictions applied to foreign vs. 
domestic firms. We develop a model of employment regulation and test its implications using data from 
the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey, conducted in 1999/2000. We find that while 
democratic accountability, corruption, and British legal origin reduce the extent of government 
intervention in firms' employment decision, they give greater advantage to domestic relative to foreign 
investors. Rule of law, on the other hand, has a more even effect. Better investment opportunities in the 
country enhance the government's bargaining power vis-à-vis investors and increase employment 
intervention, especially in foreign firms engaged in less tradable sectors. We also identify a host of other 
factors that influence employment restrictions, though none of them entail a differential impact on foreign 
investors. We find that after controlling for other factors, foreign investors in Latin America face a greater 
regulatory disadvantage vis-à-vis locals compared to other regions of the world, though this is partly 
counterbalanced by other effects captured in the model. 
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Globalization is believed to be making the world's economic playing field flat (Friedman, 2005). 
To attract investment, countries are under pressure to offer assorted incentives to foreign investors. In 
response, capital movements across boarders, especially in the form of foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
have been increasing at a very rapid pace. Indeed, FDI has now become the main source of development 
capital for many emerging markets.
1 However, the distribution of those flows is quite uneven. In many 
countries, the incentives being offered seem to be partial compensations for exacting government 
regulations that foreign investors are likely to face during the production process [Halland and Wooton, 
(2002) and Gorg, 2003)]. On the other hand, critics of globalization claim that governments are yielding 
too much sovereignty, leaving the domestic producers vulnerable to the whims of powerful transnational 
enterprises (TNEs).
2 Has the playing field become indeed tilted in favor of foreign investors, or do they 
still face discrimination vis-à-vis domestic entrepreneurs? Are the deviations from regulation parity 
between the two groups random, or are there discernible patterns related to country and firm 
characteristics?  
Despite the centrality and popularity of these issues in the current globalization debates, 
systematic research on them is scant. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study on the 
determinants of FDI policies, and the theoretical literature has mainly focused on analyzing tax holidays 
and equity restrictions.
3 However, unevenness in the treatments of foreign and domestic investors are by 
no means confined to those policies. Tilts and bumps on investors' paths can take many other forms; e.g., 
controls on financial transactions between transnational enterprises (entrepreneurs) and their local 
affiliates, minimum requirements for the use of local inputs, and restrictions on imports and the 
employment of foreign personnel. Not surprisingly, all such policies affect FDI flows [Clark (2000), 
Taylor (2000), and Asiedu and Lien (2004)]. It is therefore important to understand the factors that 
determine the wide ranges of incentive and restrictive policies that shape investment.  
This paper takes a step to fill this gap in the literature by examining the differential intervention 
in employment decisions of domestic vs. foreign firms.  We construct a model of employment regulation 
based on the differences between the preferences of the government and the entrepreneurs over taxation 
and redistribution towards workers. This motivates intervention in the employment decisions of firms, 
which materializes depending the political benefits and costs of such intervention in each specific case. 
We focus on the role played by foreign vs. domestic ownership in such calculus and derive testable 
                                                 
1 Over the period 1991-2004, the share of FDI in total flows to developing countries increased from 24% to about 
50%, while the share of official capital (loans and aid from multilateral organizations such as the World Bank) 
declined from 56% to 7% (World Bank, 2005). 
2 For more on this issue see Blomstrom and Kokko (2003). 
3 See Asiedu and Esfahani (2004) for a review of the theoretical literature on FDI restrictions.  
  1 implications of the model. We then test the relevant hypotheses using data on employment restrictions 
derived from the 1999/2000 World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (WBES) (see section 3 
for a detailed description). Our analysis employs data on 6354 firms operating in 67 countries, of which 
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* Intervention rate is the percent of firms that report the government at least sometimes intervenes in their employment 
decisions (with any frequency or intensity). Foreign firms are defined as those with majority foreign ownership. The 
sample is restricted to countries that have at least 6 foreign majority firms in the survey. 
Source: World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 2000, info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/ . 
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There is enormous variation in the extent of employment intervention that firms experience 
across countries (Figure 1, for the exact definition of intervention and other details, see Section 3 below). 
Although there is significant correlation between the interventions in employment decisions of foreign 
and domestic firms, as Figure 1 depicts, there are also substantial deviations from regulation parity 
between the two groups across countries. This is more clearly shown in Figure 2a that maps the relative 
employment intervention experience of foreign firms against GDP per capita of the countries in our 
sample. An immediate observation emerging from these figures is that there is no clear general bias in 
favor or against foreign investors in the world as a whole, though the situation varies greatly from country 
to country.  An important part of these differences are regional, with particularly large variation among 
transition countries. However, as Figure 2b shows, even focusing on a region such as Latin America that 
has a long history of attracting foreign investment, one can observe major differences in regulatory 
intervention between foreign and domestic firms.  



























* Intervention rate is the percent of firms that report the government at least sometimes intervenes in their 
employment decisions (with any frequency or intensity). Foreign firms are defined as those with majority foreign 
ownership. The sample is restricted to countries that have at least 6 foreign majority firms in the survey. 
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Relative to Intervention Rate in Domestic Majority Firms in Latin America
Rate of Intervention in Employment Decisions of Foreign Majority Firms*
Regulation parity line
  3 Of course, the observations of differential regulations in the above figures do not control for 
country or firm characteristics. Identifying the relevant characteristics and finding out what factors may 
account for the differences in the regulation of foreign and domestic firms are the tasks of our theoretical 
and empirical models. Through those steps we find that the power of foreign entrepreneurs diminishes 
relative to their domestic counterparts as corruption rises, even though corruption seems to enable firms 
generally to payoff officials and reduce government intervention in their labor decisions. Interestingly, the 
same is true about democratic accountability. Both factors seem to enable firms to influence politics and 
reduce intervention in their business, but the benefits go a lot more to the domestic business owners than 
to foreigner investors. So, regulatory discrimination against foreign investors seems to be highest in 
corrupt democracies, even though overall employment restrictions are lower. These effects are quite 
robust even when we control for a host of other factors, including legal origin and regional effects. 
Interestingly, the British legal origin, which tends to reduce government intervention (as observed in 
previous research; e.g., Botero et al., 2004), seems to act the same way as democratic accountability, 
benefiting domestic investors more than foreigners. However, this is not the case for the rule of law, 
which seems to reduce intervention for all firms. 
We also find evidence that controlling for other factors, countries with better investment 
opportunities—those with higher growth rates, greater openness, and more educated labor force—find it 
easier to be more demanding of firms, especially foreign firms, in their employment regulation practices. 
This result is strengthened by another finding in our empirical work that the extent of foreign presence 
among firms in a country—which can be an indicator opportunities for foreign investment—increases the 
probability of intervention in foreign relative to domestic firm. Since larger presence of foreign investors 
should in principle give them more power to influence the government and lower intervention in their 
businesses, our finding of a positive effect shows that the rise in the politicians' bargaining power as a 
result of increased investment opportunities is a stronger force.  
The role of the government's bargaining position vis-à-vis foreign investors seems to apply 
particularly to the firms in the less traded sectors of the economy—construction and services—where 
foreign firms have fewer options to move their production elsewhere and rely on exports to the country. 
Indeed, controlling for other factors, foreign firms in manufacturing appear to face far less labor 
restrictions than their domestic counterparts, even though manufacturing firms as a whole are subject to 
more employment intervention than those in other sectors.  
Our theoretical model shows that the weakness of labor organizations and the ability of the 
government to extract the producers' surpluses through taxation reduce the politicians' interest in 
imposing labor regulation. Similarly, the size of firm's assets and government participation in equity are 
  4 likely to make a firm a more attractive and easier target for regulation. However, these effects need not 
entail differential impacts on foreign firms. These points are, indeed, confirmed by our empirical work. 
Finally, we consider the possible roles played by regional and neighborhood effects that may not 
be captured among country characteristics included in the model. We find that after controlling for other 
factors, foreign investors in Latin America face a greater regulatory disadvantage vis-à-vis locals 
compared to other regions of the world, though this is partly counterbalanced by other effects captured in 
the model. South Asia region represents the opposite case. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a model of employment 
regulation and derives its implications for the experience of a firm that may be jointly or wholly owned by 
domestic and foreign investors. Section 3 describes the data,  and the empirical methodology for testing 
those implications and other possible effects. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 
concludes.  
2. A Model of Differential Employment Policy Towards Foreign and Domestic Investors 
2.1. The Setting 
Consider a country that has many investment opportunities (projects), some of which are better 
suited to the skills and assets of foreign investors, some require a combination of foreign and domestic 
entrepreneurs, and the rest are the realm of the latter's comparative advantage. To keep the model simple 
and focus on the differential labor policies towards domestic and foreign firms once they have come into 
existence, we take the allocation of projects between the two groups as given. In other words, we assume 
that some of the available projects can only be operated by foreign investors (i.e., 100% foreign 
ownership), some require a given amount of sharing (i.e., joint venture), and others are only suitable for 
operation by domestic entrepreneurs (i.e., 100% domestic ownership).  
 To begin, we focus on a single project that is operated by a group of entrepreneurs who provide 
technological, managerial, and capital inputs for the project through the tangible and intangible assets that 
they own. Let t be the aggregate indicator of these inputs and let φ ∈ [0,1] indicate the share of foreign 
entrepreneurs in this measure. We will refer to the entrepreneurs and their project as the firm. φ = 0 means 
full domestic ownership and φ = 1, full foreign ownership. The values in between indicate joint 
ownership. The project produces q units of a product by means of the entrepreneurs' technological, 
managerial, and capital inputs, t, and local labor, l. Let the production function be constant returns to 
scale and Cobb-Douglas:  
(2.1)  q = al
λt
1−λ, 
  5 where a > 0  is a parameter that represents the country characteristics that enhance business operations 
and increase the productivity of the project at no cost to the firm — for example, public goods, especially 
effective institutions and the publicly available technologies.
4 The parameter λ represents the importance 
of local labor in the project's operation. It is higher when local labor has better and wider ranges of assets, 
such as higher education or technical abilities.
5  
We assume that the entrepreneurs' assets are not contractible and, therefore, they need to own and 
control the residual rights to the project in order to recover the returns to the use of their assets. The firm 
must pay tax at a fixed rate, τ ∈ [0,1], on the net output. The same tax rate applies to labor income.
6 We 
assume that the labor market also has imperfections, but in that case, contracting problems only drive a 
wedge between the market price and the workers' reservation wage.
7 We treat the wage rate, w, as given 
and normalize the labor unit such that its reservation price (or opportunity costs) is equal to 1. Then, the 
wage premium is w − 1 > 0. For the output, we assume that the price, p, is exogenously given and that the 
market has no imperfection. A rise in p indicates an increase in demand for the product relative to its 
supply. 
Another set of simplifying assumption concerns the nature of the firms' assets. We assume that 
the aggregate input, t > 0, is exogenously given and that the entrepreneurs face a dichotomous choice: 
they can either use all of their assets in production or withhold them entirely (in which case the project 
will not operate). Finally, we normalize the reservation value of the assets outside the project to zero. 
These assumptions facilitate the analysis, but do not change the basic results concerning the government's 
motives to impose employment restrictions on the project and its differential treatment of domestic and 
foreign investors. 
We start the analysis by examining the labor input choice by the firm when the government does 
not intervene in the project. This is followed by an examination of the government's preferences over the 
                                                 
4 Thus, we model a as a summary of country characteristics that enhance the productivity of the project and also 
exhibit the two characteristics of a public good, i.e., these factors are nontrivial and nonexclusive. 
5 This idea can be formalized by specifying the production function as log q =  , where s∈[0,1] is an 
index for a continuum of differentiated inputs required for the production of the output and x(s) is the quantity of 
input of variety s. The range of input varieties supplied local labor would then be the equivalent of λ, the share of 




0 ) ( log ds s x s
6 The assumption that labor and profit income tax rates are the same is made to keep things simple. Allowing for 
differential taxation does not change the results of the paper. 
7 The reservation wage could be the value of home production. It could be also viewed as the expected wage for an 
unemployed workers, inclusive of the net income and utility loss due to unemployment. 
  6 labor input and its decision to regulate. We then derive the comparative statics with respect to the extent 
of foreign ownership and other parameters. 
2.2. The Entrepreneurs' Preferred Level of Employment Input 
 The firm maximizes its after-tax profits, π(l), which is given by: 
(2.2)  π(l) = (1−τ)(pq − wl). 
Given that the entrepreneurs' opportunity cost of engaging in the project is zero, they would use their 
assets and operate the project as long as π ≥ 0. Any positive profit is then distributed between foreign and 
domestic partners in the firm according to their shares, φ and 1−φ, respectively. Since the marginal 
product of labor is very large at low levels of employment, the firm can earn positive profits at some 
employment levels. But, profits decline beyond some employment level and eventually become zero. The 
largest feasible employment in the project, where π = 0, is given by: 












  The first-order condition for maximizing π with respect to l is: 
(2.4)  λpq = wl. 
The solution to (2.4),  , is the firm's preferred level of employment: 
*
F l













 < l0. 
2.3   The Government's Preferences 
  The politicians in charge of the country's government may benefit from the project in three 
different ways. First, the project adds to the tax revenue, which the politicians value because they need 
funding for government activities that they control. The amount of this revenue is the total income tax 
delivered by the project, net of the expected taxes that the workers would have paid in their alternative 
jobs; that is, τpq − τl. Second, the surplus gained by the workers, (1− τ)(w −1)l, helps improve welfare 
and adds to the political support for the ruling politicians. Third, a similar argument applies to the firm 
profits earned by domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, who may contribute to the politicians in various 
ways. With these considerations, we specify the utility function of the politicians, expressed in terms of 
units of tax revenue, as: 
  7 (2.6)  u(l) = τpq − τl + θ(1− τ)(w −1)l + ω(φ)π(l) 
         = [τ + ω(φ)(1−τ)]pq − {[τ + ω(φ)(1−τ)]w − [τ + θ(1− τ)](w −1)}l 




+ ω(φ)]π(l) + [τ + θ(1− τ)](w −1)l, 
where θ and ω(φ) are the premia that the politicians place on each unit of surplus earned by workers and 
the firm domestic entrepreneurs, respectively. The dependence of valuation of firm surplus on foreign 
share is the key feature that allows us to explore the differential treatment that foreign investors may 
receive. For this purpose, we specify ω as a linear function, ω(φ) ≡ η + ϕφ, where η is the politicians' 
valuation of a unit of surplus earned by domestic entrepreneurs and ϕ is the preference they give to 
foreign investors. When ϕ > 0, the politicians prefer to see profits go to foreign entrepreneurs (because 
they deliver contributions more effectively or provide other benefits); when ϕ ≤ 0 the opposite is true. The 
latter is more likely when domestic entrepreneurs have a comparative advantage in engaging in domestic 
politics and influencing the politicians.  
We assume that 
(2.7)  θ < 1  and  ω(φ) < 1  
i.e., the politicians' valuation of a dollar in the hands of workers or entrepreneurs is less than the marginal 
value of a dollar of tax. This is reasonable because if the government valued money more in the hands of 
worker or entrepreneurs than in the treasury, it could distribute its funds to them (or simply not tax their 
incomes).  
If there is no intervention cost, the government prefers to choose the employment level by 
maximizing u with respect to l subject to the entrepreneurs' participation constraint, l ≤ l0. This constraint 
does not bind if the labor share, λ, and political weight on labor income, θ, are sufficiently small such 
that: 
(2.8) [τ +(1−τ)θ](w −1) −(1−λ)[τ + (1−τ)ω(φ)]w ≤ 0.  
When (2.8) holds, the first-order condition yields: 
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F l .  
A quick examination of (2.9) shows that when l0 >  >  . The latter inequality follows from the fact 





  8 2.4. The Government's Employment Policy 
  The divergence between the employment preferences of the firm and the government creates a 
motive for policy intervention in the labor input decision. The politicians' gain from intervening in 
employment and requiring the project to employ l is  
(2.10)  u(l) − u( ) = [(π(
*






) + [τ + θ(1− τ)](w −1)(l − ). 
*
F l
Obviously, u(l) − u( ) is increasing in 
*
F l l up to l = , where it is maximized. Although the government 
always prefers a higher level of employment than the firm, it may refrain from imposing employment 
regulations on the entrepreneur because that may entail costs that could exceed the benefits from the 
politicians' point of view. The costs consist of administrative effort as well as the risks of costly mistakes, 
which may depend on the project and country characteristics, but also contain idiosyncratic random 
elements for individual projects. The government chooses to intervene in a project's employment level if 
the maximum net benefit that it can obtain from such an action is positive.  
*
G l
  It is reasonable to assume that the intervention costs have a fixed part, ξ, but also depend on the 
size of required adjustment in the project's employment, l  − . As a first-order approximation, we 
specify the intervention costs as ξ + μ|
*
F l
l − |, where μ is the marginal cost of moving employment away 
from the firm's choice. Then, the politicians' net benefits from imposing employment level 
*
F l
l , is 
(2.11)  B(l) ≡ u(l) − u( ) − μ|
*
F l l − | − ξ.  
*
F l
The government intervenes when there is an l ≤ l0 such that B(l) > 0. The following proposition shows 
that a necessary condition for this is that the net marginal value of employment intervention, N, must be 
positive: 
(2.12)  N ≡ [τ + (1−τ)θ](w −1) − μ > 0. 
Note that the first term in N is the marginal value of workers' surplus and μ is the marginal cost of 
intervention to the politicians. Under this condition, if the fixed costs of intervention are not prohibitive, 
the politicians will impose the employment limit, 
*
G l , determined by: 
(2.13) 
*
G l  = l0          i f   N > (1−λ)[τ+(1−τ)ω(φ)]w; 
(2.14) 
*









− ω τ − + τ
ω τ − + τ 1
1
] ) 1 ( [
] ) 1 ( [
N w
w *
F l      if  (1−λ)[τ+(1−τ)ω(φ)]w ≥ N > 0. 
  9 The case in (2.13) materializes if the net marginal value of employment intervention is sufficiently high to 
render the l ≤ l0 constraint binding. This is more likely when the political value of firm surplus, ω, is 
small and the role of labor in production, λ, is large. When N is not sufficiently large, then if an 
employment regulation is imposed, it will not be constrained by l0. 
PROPOSITION 1. (i) Requiring the firm to employ a different number of workers than its preferred level, 
, is not worthwhile—yields B(
*
F l l) ≤ 0—when N ≡ [τ + (1−τ)θ](w −1) − μ ≤ 0.  
(ii) When N > 0, employment restriction is worthwhile only if 
(2.15) B (
*
G l ) = [(π(
*








G l − ) − ξ > 0. 
*
F l
PROOF. (i) First note that for all l <  , 
*
F l B(l) < 0 because u(l) − u( ) < 0 and intervention costs are 
positive. When N ≤ 0, according to (2.14), for the employment level that maximizes 
*
F l
B(l) we have l
* <l . 
Therefore, in this case, the payoff from intervention, 
*
F
B(l), cannot be positive for any l. 
(ii) When N > 0, two situations arise. First, if N > (1−λ)[τ+(1−τ)ω]w, B(l) will be increasing for all l < l0 
and its maximum in that range occurs at 
*
G l = l0. Thus, the government intervenes only if B(l0) > 0. 
Second, if N < (1−λ)[τ+(1−τ)ω]w, then l ≤ l0 does not bind and l
* is the solution to the first-order 
condition for B(l), with < 
*
F l l
* ≤ l0 . Therefore, government intervenes only if B(l
*) > 0. Combining these 
two situations yields (2.15) as the condition for intervention when N > 0.   Q.E.D. 
  
  Proposition 1 provides the necessary relationships for examining the impact of various parameters 
on the decision to regulate. Given that ξ and μ have random components, the probability that the 
government intervenes in a particular project, Pr[N > 0 I B(
*
G l ) > 0], rises with the factors that raise 
B(
*
G l ) and N at least when these indicators are in the neighborhood of 0. Therefore, to derive testable 
implications about the likelihood of intervention in employment decisions of a firm, we examine the 
derivatives of B(
*
G l ) and N with respect to the parameters of the model, starting with the extent of foreign 
ownership, φ. Since N is independent of φ, we only need to examine ∂B(
*
G l )/∂φ. Using the envelope 
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All these derivatives except ∂B/∂ξ are positive in the neighborhood of B(
*
G l ) = 0. Therefore, an increase 
 should increase the probability of employment intervention. 
An increase in the fixed cost of intervention naturally reduces the incentive to impose restrictions. 
in price, productivity, or the assets of the firm
*   Among the parameters that affect both N and B( G l ), θ and μ have non-ambiguous effects on the 
probability of intervention. The results are intuitive: intervention is more likely when the political weight 
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F l ) > 0. 








* (2.23)  G F l  −l ) < 0. 
*
  11*
G l   , raises N,  e B( The wage rate, w and may rais ) as well if θ is not too small relative to ω(φ).  In 
this case, the derivative of B(
*
G l ) is different depending on whether 
*
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F l /w. 
A higher w means a larger worker surplus, which adds to politicians' interest in expanding employment. 
to  disco age regulation if the worker's political weight is not 
ecomes more likely if θ is relatively small compared to ω, in which case the main 
However, this is costly  the firms and may  ur
sufficiently large.   
  Finally, an increase in the tax rate, τ, has ambiguous effects on employment intervention. In this 
case, intervention b
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 M el 
  The above results imply that all else equal, the likelihood of government intervention in 
of the entrepreneur's technological input,  
y enhances the productivity of 
−  iticians place on each unit of surplus earned by workers, and  
The imp ership also depends 
on the p
Testable Implications of the od
employment increases with  
−  the importance of the contribution of local labor to the project,  
−  the extensiveness 
−  the extent to which the economic conditions in the host countr
the project, 
−  limitations on political mechanisms for business owners to influence policymakers,  
the value pol
−  the wage premium, if preference for worker surplus is sufficiently large. 
act of the tax rate on income and wages is unclear. The impact of foreign own
olitician's preference for domestic relative to foreign entrepreneurs, −ϕ.  
  12  Most of the above hypotheses are concerned with the regulation of labor generally, rather than the 
role played by foreign ownership. While we present some results regarding those hypotheses, the full 
ce over local politicians. We highlight two elements in this respect: the 
s regulation of firms with foreign ownership. In particular, 
ne may
vention rises with foreign ownership in 
countrie
exploration of those issues is the subject of a related paper of ours, Asiedu and Esfahani (2006). In this 
paper, our focus is on the differences in regulation that may emerge due to domestic vs. foreign 
ownership of the project. It is therefore important to examine the nature of parameter ϕ in more detail. ϕ 
cannot be treated as a constant across countries or industries. In fact, making such an assumption tends to 
yield estimates for ϕ that are not distinguishable from zero because it is positive in some situations and 
negative in others. For this reason, we consider the role of country characteristics that may advantage or 
disadvantage foreign investors.  
  The key factor that shapes the relative political preference for domestic vs. foreign investors is the 
extent of their access and influen
extent of democratic accountability and corruption. Under dictatorships, domestic as well as foreign 
entrepreneurs have few rights and benefits of citizenship. As a result, domestic entrepreneurs have few 
advantages over foreigners in buying political influence by offering services to the dictator. More 
democratic settings voice and opportunities to exert influence first and foremost to the nationals compared 
to foreigners. Of course, to the extent that democracy is associated with the rule of law, foreign investors 
may also benefit from democratization, at least to the extent that they can count on due process. But, in 
the absence of rule of law and presence of rampant corruption, domestic entrepreneurs are likely to enjoy 
a larger advantage in buying influence with local politicians. Therefore, we expect the likelihood of 
government intervention in a firm's employment to rise with the extent of foreign ownership in countries 
with more democracy and greater corruption. 
  The extent of overall foreign investor presence in the country may be another factor that shapes 
the politicians' differential disposition toward
o  expect a larger foreign presence to give that group stronger influence in the country's political 
system. However, large foreign presence may also indicate the significant opportunities for foreign 
investment, which enables the government to be more demanding of firms run by foreign investors. 
Therefore, the net effect of foreign investor presence in the country on relationship between foreign 
ownership and employment regulation is an empirical question.  
If investment opportunities indeed enable the government to be bolder in imposing regulation on 
foreign investors, we should also observe that employment inter
s with higher growth rates. Testing this effect, besides being of interest by itself, is useful for 
shedding more light on the results that we obtain regarding foreign presence.  
  13There are, of course, other country characteristics that may affect the position of foreign vs. 
domestic investors. For example, the country's legal origin, openness, economic structure, unionization, 
human 
s to employment regulation. In particular, 
resenting 
the mod
The data for employment restrictions comes from the World Bank's World Business Environment 
BES), conducted in 1999/2000. The aim of the survey was to identify the factors that constrain 
investm
e government intervene in employment decisions by your firm?" 
capital, or infrastructure may also matter in the way foreigners are treated. We explore a number 
of such potential effects in our empirical exercises. We also consider regional dummies that may account 
for the effects of location and neighborhood around the globe. 
  Besides country variables, firm characteristics may also play a role in the advantage or 
disadvantage that foreign entrepreneurs experience with regard
the relative power of foreign investors may vary across industries, firm sizes, and capital intensities. 
Foreign investors entering less tradable sectors such as construction and services may face greater 
disadvantage vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts compared to those who enter the more tradable 
production activities, which can be moved out of the country if government interventions are too 
stringent. Also, larger and more capital intensive firms may be better regulation targets, though it is not 
clear that these factors put foreign investors at greater disadvantage compared to domestic ones. 
The next section describes the data and the estimation methods that we use to measure the above 
variable and assess their impacts on employment intervention. A summary of the indicators rep
el's variables and their associated effects is presented in Table 1.  
3. Data  
Survey (W
ent. The WBES database also has information on important firm attributes such as sales, assets, 
firm size, industry and ownership. The survey covered 10,032 firms in 81 countries. In general, at least 
about 100 firms were surveyed in each country. Within each country, at least 15 percent of the firms had 
foreign ownership, at least 15 percent were small (fewer than 50 employees) and at least 15 percent were 
large (more than 500 employees).  The administration of WBES followed the regional structure of World 
Bank organization and, as a result, there may have been minor differences in the way some questions 
have been posed or the data has been collected in different regions. We address this issue in our 
estimation process (see below). 
Our measure of employment restrictions is derived from the response by firms to the question:  
Question 1: "How often does th
(1) never; (2) seldom; (3) sometimes; (4) frequently; (5) usually; (6) always. 
  14To form ign scores of 1 to 6 
a on the answer to Question 1 is available for a total of 8,548 firms in 74 countries of which 
,572 a
ate is of the following form: 
.1)  
triction imposed on firm i in country j,  xij is the firm and country 
                                                
 the dependent variable for our regressions, Employment Restriction, we ass
corresponding to the six responses so that a higher number implies more intervention.
8 We also employ in 
some regressions a dichotomous version of this variable, EmpRest, which equals 1 if a firm reported that 
it "sometimes," "frequently," "usually" or "always" experience government intervention, and equals zero 
otherwise. 
  Dat
1 re foreign owned. Limitations on the availability of data for other variables reduce the sample size 
further. Our empirical analysis employs data for up to 6354 firms in 67 countries, of which 1092 have 
some foreign ownership. The countries that drop out of the sample happen to be mostly small ones with 
few observations (an average of less than 10 foreign-owned firms per country). Table 2 reports some 
basic information about employment restrictions for the countries in our sample. Clearly, it shows a wide 
variation in the degree of restrictiveness across region and countries, for foreign owned firms as well as 
firms in the full sample.
9 The description and sources of the explanatory variables used in the estimations 
are provided in Table 1. The data for the country variables are averaged over 1995-99 period. The 
summary statistics are in Table 3.  
  The equation that we estim
(3 Rij = β'xij(Fij) + γ'zij + εij, 
where  Rij is the measure of res
characteristics that lead to differential regulation of foreign vs. domestic owned firms, Fij is the share of 
foreign investors in the firm, zij is the set of variables that determine the intensity of employment 
regulation of domestically owned firms, β and γ are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and εij is an 
error term. We estimate (3.1) using fixed-effect regression (the within country regression estimator) as 
well as conditional Logit and ordered Probit methods. The estimations allow for heteroscedasticity across 
firms and countries. The fixed-effect and conditional Logit estimators control for unobserved country 
effects, while the ordered Probit estimators highlight the roles played by observed country characteristics. 
 
8 The original ordering of the answers is the reverse of the one shown in Question 1. We have re-ordered the 
answers to facilitate the interpretation of the results. 
9 Note that the graphs in Section 1 are based on the full survey and foreign firms that have majority ownership (i.e., 
more than 50% foreign share) whereas the data in Table 2 pertains to only to the firms in our sample. Furthermore in 
Table 3, we focus on all foreign firms in the sample, i.e., firms with foreign share greater than zero. 
  154. Empirical Results 
  We start with regressions that treat Employment Restriction as a continuous dependent variable 
and use fixed effects to control for the direct impacts of all observed and unobserved country 
characteristics on the restriction measure. This also addresses any sampling and survey differences that 
may affect our results. However, we do use country characteristics in interactive form with the foreign 
share in firm equity to assess their roles in the differential treatment of foreign investors in the regulatory 
process. The first two columns of Table 4 show the results for the full sample as well as a restricted 
sample, which includes only countries that have at least six majority foreign-owned firms. Note that the 
results are quite similar despite the significant difference in sample size. We only keep variables in the 
regressions that show reasonable statistical significance.  
The first two columns of Table 4 show that the coefficients of Foreign Share's interactive terms 
with Democratic Accountability, Corruption, and British Legal Origin indictors are both positive and 
highly significant, confirming the view that these factors help domestic investors much more than 
foreigners to ward off government interventions. The interaction terms with Foreign Presence and GDP 
Growth are also positive and significant (other than the case of GDP Growth in the full sample 
regression). This is consistent with the view that stronger opportunities for foreign investment in the 
country allow the host government to be more demanding of them regarding labor regulations. Being in 
the tradable manufacturing industry does the opposite by giving TNE's more outside options, as shown by 
the negative coefficient of the interaction term with the Manufacturing dummy.  
  To test for possible regional and neighborhood effects, we included regional dummies among the 
explanatory variables, taking North America as the benchmark case. In the fixed effect regressions, only 
the dummies for Latin America and South Asia (represented by India) proved significant, representing 
two opposite situations. Latin American governments seem to be more discriminatory towards foreign 
investors, given their observed characteristics, while India turns out to be relatively more cooperative with 
foreign investors than predicted by the model based on its institutional and economic characteristics 
(democracy, legal origin, growth, etc.) Other variables that we considered as possible determinants 
employment intervention did not generate any significant coefficient when entering as interactive terms 
with Foreign Share.  
A number of firm characteristics prove consequential for the extent of employment intervention, 
without differential impact on foreign vs. domestic producers. In particular, Log of Firm Assets (as a 
measure of investor input) and Government Participation have positive and significant coefficients, 
consistent with the view that they strengthen the incentives for government intervention and facilitate the 
process. We also experimented with asset-sales ratio as a measure of capital intensity, but did not find any 
  16significant result. However, the Manufacturing dummy, entering directly besides its interaction with 
Foreign Share, has a positive coefficient, pointing to the possible facilitating roles played in the 
regulatory process by the industry' heavy dependence on fixed assets or by better organization of its labor 
force relative to other sectors. 
  The continuity assumption regarding the distribution of the dependent variable used in the fixed-
effect regressions may seem too strong, given the discrete nature of Employment Restriction. To assess 
whether this indeed has significant consequences for the results, we also estimate an ordered Probit 
version of the model. However, ordered Probit does not allow one to employ fixed effects to address 
possible omitted variable biases. We deal with this issue in two ways, as discussed in the following. 
First, we use the conditional Logit method, which brings us closest to capturing fixed effects in a 
discrete choice model, but requires a dichotomous version of the dependent variable Employment 
Restriction. So, we use EmpRest, which identifies intervention levels 3-6 as high (EmpRest = 1) and other 
outcomes as low (EmpRest = 0). The results of conditional Logit estimates using EmpRest in our model 
for the full and restricted samples are reported in the last two columns of Table 4. The remarkable 
similarity of the results in terms of magnitude and significance proves quite encouraging for our findings 
based on fixed effect regressions. 
    Second, we use an ordered Probit method and introduce a host of country characteristics as 
explanatory variables to reduce the possibility of bias due to unobserved effects. This approach also 
allows us to test many of the implications of our theoretical model and to identify country attributes that 
affect the government's propensity to restrict employment. These results of estimations based on the full 
and restricted samples are presented in Table 5. In that table, we also report the Probit regressions using 
EmpRest to facilitate comparisons with the conditional Logit model in Table 4. A quick comparison of 
similar rows in Tables 4 and 5 shows that the results of our alternative econometrics approaches are 
consistent with each other, suggesting that the possible biases in those estimations are likely to be small. 
This outcome also makes us more confident that our Probit regressions do not suffer from significant 
omitted variables biases and, therefore, their results regarding other variables included in the model can 
be reliable. With the caveat that there may still be some remaining measurement errors, we proceed to 
discuss the results concerning the new variables in Table 5. 
  The first notable result in Table 5 is that Democratic Accountability, Corruption, and British 
Legal Origin as well as Rule of Law indictors all have negative and significant coefficients, supporting the 
model's prediction that Employment Restriction is reduced when there are mechanisms for warding off 
government interventions (or, alternatively, the cost of imposing restrictions—μ and ξ—are higher for the 
government). It is interesting that all these variables, except Rule of Law, help domestic entrepreneurs 
  17much more than foreigner. Rule of Law, on the other hand, seems to entail impartiality in the legal and 
administrative systems, putting domestic and foreign investors on an equal footing. It also empowers 
investors to challenge government regulations, thereby raising the cost of intervention. 
The opposite signs of the direct and interactive terms involving Democratic Accountability, 
Corruption, and British Legal Origin imply that the net effects of these variables on the regulation of 
foreign-owned firms may be ambiguous. To gauge the net effects for various levels of foreign 
participation, we evaluate the overall coefficient of each variable at the first, second and third quartiles as 
well as the mean of foreign participation among firms that involve foreign equity. This is done in Table 6 
based on the ordered Probit regression with the restricted sample shown in column (1) of Table 5. The 
results show that the overall impact of variations in democracy and corruption is essentially on the 
domestic firms rather than those with foreign participation. This is true to a much lesser extent about 
British legal origin.  
  The cluster of variables that represent economic opportunities for investment—GDP Growth, 
Education, and Openness—all have positive and highly significant coefficients. The model captures the 
role of these variables through parameter a and makes predictions that conform with these estimates. 
Among these only GDP Growth showed significance when used in interaction with Foreign Share, as we 
have seen earlier. As Table 6 shows, the overall impact on all investors is significantly positive and rising 
with foreign participation, with the heaviest regulatory consequence being experience by wholly foreign-
owned businesses. On the other hand, Foreign Presence, which proved important in the relationship 
between foreign ownership and employment intervention, has little consequence for other firms and, 
naturally, does not show significance when entered separately (estimates not reported here). 
  Union Independence, which indicates the political muscle of workers to demand jobs (measuring 
θ), has consistently positive and significant coefficient in the Probit regressions. We also included the 
Share of Agriculture in Total Employment as a possible indicator of wage premia that industrial firms pay 
over the workers' reservation wage. Our model suggests that such an indicator is likely to encourage 
greater intervention. Indeed, the estimated coefficient of the share of employment in agriculture turns out 
to be positive and significant. However, it is possible this finding may have other explanations as well.  
  Table 5 further shows that the Share of Social Security and Payroll Taxes is negatively and 
strongly associated with employment restriction. This fits well with our model that predicts such a 
relationship between τ and the probability of intervention. It confirms that when the government can 
benefit from a project through taxation, it is less inclined to interfere with the firm's labor decisions and 
reduce its profitability.  
  18  We also experimented with a host of other country characteristics to gauge possible effects not 
captured by our model. In particular, we used total GDP and population (as measures of country size that 
might indicate better prospects for investment) and GDP per capita (as a measure of the level of 
development). None of these variables proved consequential. The regional dummies included in the 
Probit regressions all carry negative signs. However, it is difficult to decipher the exact reason for this 
result because those dummies capture a host of factors, including nuances in survey details across regions.  
5. Conclusion 
  Is the world flat for international business? Our exploration into differences in employment 
interventions among firms surveyed around the globe by the World Bank shows that there may not be a 
major tilt in the playing field, but there are certainly bumps that are not always random. While greater 
political and economic openness and integration have created new opportunities for investment and 
growth in most countries, in some ways the battlefield has shifted to new grounds where domestic 
entrepreneurs may be in a better position to hold their grounds vis-à-vis foreigners. Our analysis of the 
pattern of employment restrictions across firms and countries shows that local businesses may be in better 
positions than foreign investors to circumvent government regulations. On the other hand, foreign 
investors seem to have major advantages in some areas, especially in tradable industries that give them 
easy options to move around and switch to exporting to the countries where regulations are too 
demanding. 
  Another broad implication of our findings is that, contrary to the popular view that "globalization 
is rolling back the nation-state," governments that do well and create investment opportunities can still be 
choosy. Even though they welcome trade and investment, their very success enables them to have 
bargaining power over the range of regulations that they view as important. 
  There is, of course, a lot more work required to explore these issues in different regulatory areas 
and to combine them into a broad theory of the business-government relations in a globalizing world. 
There are also empirical and theoretical limitations in this paper that need to be addressed in future work. 
However, our theoretical framework suggests a pathway towards tackling the problems involved and our 
empirical results offer a glimpse of the interesting relationships that may be uncovered as research on 
globalization progresses.  
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Restrictions  Description of the Variables  Source 
t: Investor input  Positive  Log of Firm Assets: Natural log of firm's assets  WBES 
λ: Contribution of 
Local Labor  
Positive  Education: The average years of schooling in the 
population 25 years and older. 
Barro and Lee 
(200) 
Democratic Accountability: A measure of the 





Corruption: Measures corruption within the political 
system in the form of "excessive patronage, nepotism, 
job reservations favors-for-favors and suspiciously close 



















Positive Union  Independence: Index takes the values of 1 to 4 
with the following definitions: (1) constant pattern of 
violations of the freedoms, rights of trade unions; (2) 
frequent violations of the freedoms, rights of trade 
unions; (3) occasional breaches of respect for the 
freedoms, rights of trade unions; and (4) unqualified 
respect for the freedoms, rights of trade unions. We 
recoded it as a dichotomous indicator which takes on 
value 1 when definition (4) applies and 0 otherwise.  
Human Rights 
Guide (1992) 
τ: Potential for 
Collect Direct 
Taxes 
Negative  Share of Social Security and Payroll Taxes as 





w − 1: The Wage 
Premium  
Positive if  θ/ω 
is sufficiently 
large 




φ: Foreign Equity 
Share 
Ambiguous  Foreign Share: Share of foreign investors in firm equity  WBES 
Rule of Law: Measures the strength and impartiality of 
the legal system and the observance of the rule of law. 








Inverse of Government Participation, Share of 
Government Ownership in firm equity.  A higher share 
implies a lower marginal cost of intervention. 
WBES 
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All Firms  Firms with Foreign Ownership  
Country/Region 








Percent of firms 
for which the 
Employment 
Intervention 
Index ≥ 3 
Number of 
Firms 
Percent of firms 




Transition Countries          
Albania 12  149  19  18  11 
Armenia 2  113  5  2  0 
Azerbaijan 2  121  20  3 0 
Belarus 7  119  17  8  13 
Bulgaria 9  114  12  10  10 
Croatia 10  121  10  12  8 
Czech Republic  16  123  20  20  15 
Estonia 17  125  7  21  10 
Hungary 6  99  38  6  33 
Kazakhstan 6  112  13 7 14 
Lithuania 5  77  13  4  0 
Moldova 2  108  11  2  100 
Poland 9  160  13  15  20 
Romania 19  81  16  15  20 
Russian Federation  2  486  10  9  22 
Slovak Republic  4  115  43  5  60 
Slovenia 13  122  32  16  25 
Ukraine 4  209  20  8  13 
          
Latin America & 
Caribbean          
Argentina 33  90  78  30  97 
Bolivia 24  85  91  20  95 
Brazil 26  182  60  48  60 
Chile 34  87  94  30  97 
Colombia 36  94  80  34  76 
Costa Rica  27  62  85  17  94 
Dominican Republic  23  84  95  19  95 
Ecuador 14  64  78  9  89 
El  Salvador 20  70  96 14 86 
Guatemala 13  63  86 8 88 
Haiti 21  78  99  16  94 
Honduras 16  70  96  11  100 
Mexico 15  54  85  8  100 
Nicaragua 10  72  93  7 86 
Panama 18  65  92  12  92 
Peru 21  81  86  17  76 
Trinidad & Tobago  19  72  99  14  100 
Uruguay 15  73  95  11  82 
Venezuela, RB  26  70  81  18  78 Table 2 (Continued). Employment Restrictions by Country
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All Firms  Firms with Foreign Ownership  
Country/Region 








Percent of firms 
for which the 
Employment 
Intervention 
Index ≥ 3 
Number of 
Firms 
Percent of firms 




Sub-Saharan Africa          
Botswana 44  52  52  23  61 
Cameroon 59  27  41  16  44 
Cote d'Ivoire  41  27  37  11  27 
Ethiopia 11  56  9  6  0 
Ghana 45  33  15  15  27 
Kenya 42  55  35  23  43 
Madagascar 19  52  10 10  10 
Malawi 35  34  35  12  42 
Namibia 36  45  47  16  75 
Nigeria 22  50  20  11  9 
Senegal 24  21  24  5  40 
South Africa  28  75  59  21  52 
Tanzania 43  35  37  15  53 
Uganda 28  53  21  15  27 
Zambia 31  35  26  11  18 
Zimbabwe 26  74  55  19  53 
          
Western Europe          
France 0  21  71  0   
Germany 27  96  88  26  85 
Italy 26  78  94  20  90 
Portugal 26  86  99  22  100 
Spain 19  93  86  18  89 
Sweden 17  90  94  15  93 
United Kingdom  10  77  88  8  100 
          
Others          
Canada 23  95  94  22  100 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  17  64  55  11  73 
India 29  170  40  50  34 
Thailand 29  414  27  122  22 
Tunisia 14  37  38  5  0 
Turkey 8  143  43  12  17 
United States  8  96  80  8  63 
Total  17 6,354  46  1,092  55 
* An employment intervention index ≥ 3 implies the firm reported that the government "sometimes," 
"always," "usually" or "frequently" intervened in employment decisions. 
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Variable  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
Employment Restriction  3.60 1.97 1.00 6.00 
Percent of Government Ownership  4.82 20.08 0.00  100.00 
Log of Firm Assets  13.61 6.85  0.00 25.89 
Foreign Share (Share of foreign investors in firm equity)  0.14 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Foreign Presence (Share of majority foreign owned 
firms in country sample of WBES dataset) 
0.03 0.07 0.00 0.40 
Manufacturing Dummy  0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Education (Average years of schooling in the population 
25 years and older)  1.80 0.42 0.20 2.50 
Democratic Accountability  4.47 1.01 1.73 6.00 
Rule of Law  4.29 1.17 2.00 6.00 
Corruption  3.54 1.09 1.00 5.30 
Openness (Share of Trade in GDP)  60.71 26.44 18.17  110.82 
GDP Growth (% per year)  3.18 1.86  −1.20  7.00 
Union Independence  0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Share of Agriculture in Total Employment  0.24 0.20 0.01 0.80 
Share of Social Security and Payroll Taxes  0.17 0.17 0.00 0.51 
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Estimation Method: Country Fixed Effect and Conditional Logit 
(p-values are given in parentheses below coefficient estimates) 
 
Fixed Effect  Conditional Logit Regressions 
Dependent Variable:  
Employment Restriction,  
Range 1-6 
Dependent Variable: 
EmpRest Dummy  

























Foreign Share  −2.611***  −2.219***  −4.115***  −3.309** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.030) 
Foreign Share* Democratic 
Accountability  0.262*** 0.229***  0.398**  0.322* 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.023) (0.074) 
Foreign Share* Corruption  0.247** 0.236**  0.319*  0.309 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.092) (0.129) 
Foreign Share* British Legal 
Origin  0.288** 0.254**  0.600***  0.491** 
  (0.032) (0.048) (0.010) (0.035) 
Foreign Share*Foreign 
Presence  1.361** 1.153**  1.648*  1.342 
  (0.021) (0.039) (0.074) (0.131) 
Foreign Share* GDP Growth  0.090** 0.052  0.226***  0.149** 
  (0.021) (0.125) (0.000) (0.032) 
Foreign Share*Manufacturing 
Dummy  −0.279**  −0.279**  −0.587***  −0.611*** 
  (0.030) (0.020) (0.002) (0.001) 
Manufacturing Dummy  0.101** 0.089**  0.239***  0.254*** 
  (0.030) (0.020) (0.008) (0.000) 
Percent of Government 
Ownership  0.006***  0.005*** 0.006** 0.007*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.003) 
Log of Firm Assets  0.026*** 0.025*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.008) 
Foreign Share* Latin America  0.330** 0.281* 0.734** 0.537* 
  (0.031) (0.054) (0.011) (0.063) 
Foreign Share* South Asia  −1.353**  −1.243**  −2.686***  −2.416*** 
  (0.022) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  2.856*** 2.524***     
  (0.000) (0.000)     
Number  of  Firms  4780 6354 4780 6354 
Number  of  Countries  57 67 57 67 
 
Notes: * Significant at 10% ,** Significant at 5%  and *** Significant at 1%. 
a Sample of countries included in the survey with at least six majority foreign-owned firms. 
b An employment intervention index ≥ 3 implies the firm reported that the government "sometimes," 
"always," "usually" or "frequently" intervened in employment decisions. 
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Estimation Method: Ordered Probit and Probit Regressions 
(p-values are given in parentheses below coefficient estimates) 
 
Ordered Probit Regressions  Probit Regressions 
Dependent Variable: 
Employment Restriction,  
Range 1-6 
Dependent Variable: 
EmpRest Dummy  

















Foreign Share  −2.384***  −2.070***  −3.151***  −2.780*** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.004) 
Foreign Share*Democratic 
Accountability  0.263*** 0.248*** 0.368***  0.348*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)  (0.004) 
Foreign Share*Corruption  0.184** 0.162*  0.190  0.159 
  (0.029) (0.052) (0.134)  (0.204) 
Foreign Share*British Legal 
Origin  0.169 0.158 0.091  0.052 
  (0.203) (0.229) (0.647)  (0.792) 
Foreign Share*Foreign 
Presence  1.198** 1.133**  2.493***  2.533*** 
  (0.033) (0.043) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Foreign Share* GDP 
Growth  0.087** 0.041  0.092  0.046 
  (0.036) (0.318) (0.120)  (0.431) 
Foreign Share* 
Manufacturing Dummy  −0.250**  −0.242**  −0.282  −0.282 
  (0.043) (0.048) (0.102)  (0.101) 
Manufacturing Dummy  0.119*** 0.104** 0.169***  0.163*** 
  (0.007) (0.016) (0.005)  (0.005) 
Percent of Government 
Ownership  0.001 0.002 0.000  0.001 
  (0.259) (0.147) (0.730)  (0.669) 
Log of Firm Assets  0.020*** 0.019*** 0.026***  0.026*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Foreign Share* Latin 
America  0.291* 0.257  0.367  0.315 
  (0.066) (0.101) (0.112)  (0.169) 
Foreign Share* South Asia  −0.927**  −0.767*  −1.231*  −1.047 
  (0.025) (0.062) (0.057)  (0.105) 
Democratic Accountability  −0.257***  −0.218***  −0.246***  −0.198*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) 
Corruption  −0.089**  −0.083**  −0.113**  −0.110** 
  (0.019) (0.028) (0.039)  (0.042) 
Rule of Law  −0.204***  −0.124***  −0.229***  −0.132** 
  (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)  (0.030) 
British Legal Origin  −0.354***  −0.291***  −0.385***  −0.321** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.007)  (0.023) 
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Estimation Method: Ordered Probit and Probit Regressions 
(p-values are given in parentheses below coefficient estimates) 
 
Ordered Probit Regressions  Probit Regressions 
Dependent Variable: 
Employment Restriction,  
Range 1-6 
Dependent Variable: 
EmpRest Dummy  

















GDP Growth (% per year)  0.049** 0.089*** 0.057**  0.089*** 
  (0.013) (0.000) (0.039)  (0.001) 
Education  0.878*** 0.659*** 0.901***  0.656*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Openness  0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009***  0.007*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Union Independence  0.744*** 0.537*** 0.695***  0.447*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) 
Share of Agriculture in 
Total Employment  1.386*** 0.860*** 1.090***  0.489 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)  (0.138) 
Share of Social Security and 
Payroll Taxes  −1.657***  −1.555***  −1.525***  −1.456*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Transition Countries  −2.051***  −2.215***  −2.013***  −2.122*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  −1.630***  −1.659***  −1.675***  −0.399** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.021) 
Middle East & North Africa  −1.557***  −1.521***  −1.473***  −1.167*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Latin America & Caribbean  −0.206*  −0.119  −0.507***  −1.707*** 
  (0.097) (0.338) (0.003)  (0.000) 
East Asia and Pacific  −2.330***  −2.146***  −2.222***  −1.417*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
South Asia  −1.205***  −1.260***  −1.143***  −2.054*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant     1.075**  1.002** 
     (0.025)  (0.038) 
Number of Firms  3667  3781  3667  3781 
Number of Countries  40  41  40  41 
 
Notes: * Significant at 10% ,** Significant at 5%  and *** Significant at 1%. 
a Sample of countries included in the survey with at least six majority foreign-owned firms. 
b An employment intervention index ≥ 3 implies the firm reported that the government "sometimes," 





































Manufacturing Dummy   0.119***  0.019  −0.044  −0.046  −0.055 
  (0.007)  (0.697) (0.554) (0.538) (0.242) 
Democratic Accountability  −0.257***  −0.152***  −0.086  −0.083  0.006 
  (0.000)  (0.002) (0.175) (0.193) (0.944) 
Corruption  −0.089**  −0.015 0.031  0.032  0.174 
  (0.019)  (0.691) (0.569) (0.551) (0.223) 
British Legal Origin  −0.354***  −0.286***  −0.244**  −0.242**  −0.185 
  (0.000)  (0.003) (0.032) (0.035) (0.208) 
GDP Growth (% per year)  0.049**  0.084*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.136*** 
  (0.013)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Latin America & Caribbean  −0.206*  −0.090  −0.017  −0.014  0.085 
  (0.097)  (0.473) (0.032) (0.921) (0.630) 
South Asia  −1.205***  −1.576***  −1.808***  −1.817***  −2.132*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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